Articles:
The Cult of Silvio Berlusconi: Why Italians keep Voting for ´Il Cavaliere´

On the subject of Silvio Berlusconi
Italians and non-Italians are, to paraphrase George Bernard-Shaw’s famous quip
about Britain and America, divided by a common political language.

We think we share the view that in a
political world dominated by mass communications, there is little room for
forgiveness about scandals, or other personal failures, or a poor record in
office. Yet on those grounds, Berlusconi should have died a political death
long ago, rather than coming a very close second in the Italian elections on
February 24^th.

Foreigners, perhaps, will always remain
baffled by Berlusconi’s success in continuing to attract voters. But Italians,
horrified by him though plenty of them are, tend to be a lot less surprised.
That is because they think of him in context, rather than in isolation. In
Italian politics, the context is all.

What this means, and what it meant for
Berlusconi’s remarkable feat in nearly doubling his share of the vote between
his opinion poll ratings in November 2012 and the election itself, can be laid
out in the following evidently misleading indicators:

He
makes unbelievable promises. In part this is true:
one of Berlusconi’s traits is his willingness to say one thing today and the
opposite tomorrow, to attract attention from different groups or on different
occasions, totally without shame. Italians know this, and those who support him
tend to see it as an endearing part of his character, part of his desire to
entertain and to please. But also it is misleading: the key promise he made
during the 2013 election campaign was entirely believable: that he would cut or
even abolish a dreaded property tax, known by its Italian initials as IMU.

His
record makes him untrustworthy. Yes, on overall
economic policy. But not on taxes. He has promised to cut them before, and has
delivered on at least some of those promises. The promise to cut IMU was made
in an artfully incredible way, as he wrote to voters saying he would pay them
back for the tax from his own pocket, which very few will have believed. But
that did not matter: it drew attention to the proposal in an eye-catching way,
and reinforced the only important point—that he would cut the tax.

He
is irresponsible. Yes, but so is almost everyone,
to the cynical Italian political mind. His plan for how to finance this tax cut
had as many holes in it as a sieve, but that did not really matter. It would
have to be financed by taxes on other people, or cuts in spending on other
things. Fine, said his voters: at least this awful tax will go. In offering a
relentless focus on that tax, he showed that he was listening to the pain of
his voters, taking them seriously, rather than talking down to them like most
other parties.

His
trials and sex scandals make him a national shame. Not
really, though at times his behavior has stretched even the Italian tolerance.
But the context is important: plenty of people think the justice system works disastrously
badly in Italy, so that if Berlusconi is caught up in it, like so many others,
then so what? And his sex scandals are really part of his own marketing plan:
he cavorts with scantily clad young women in order to make himself look
glamorous, young, entertaining and happy. Moreover, his antics with women act
as a distraction from his other weaknesses, like a kind of tranquillizer for
those who might otherwise get angry with him. A lot of Italians, especially
young women, hate him for this. But enough either don’t care or are sympathetic
to him to mean that this does not harm him fatally in political terms.

His
opponents are more statesmanlike and responsible. Yes,
that is true of Mario Monti, the caretaker prime minister for the past year who
then decided to run in the elections with a centrist list of candidates. But it
is not particularly true of his big opponents, the leftwing Democratic Party,
which has its own scandals, its own selfish interests and, during the election
campaign, its own evidence of the abuse of political power in the case of
Italy’s third-largest (and oldest) bank, Monte dei Paschi di Siena, whose
business was run and distorted in the interests of local Democratic Party
politicians in that area. So the PD (by its Italian initials) is considered
also corrupt and self-centred, neutralizing Berlusconi’s disadvantage on that
measure. Since both the PD leader, Pierluigi Bersani, and Mr Monti are dull,
leaden communicators who failed to offer any positive, hopeful message for
their voters, the way was opened for Berlusconi.

 Only
one party in the election really stood for change: the Five Star Movement of
Beppe Grillo. This meant that Berlusconi’s
old-fashioned, tax-cutting message, geared towards preserving his own political
power, had plenty of space in which to operate. And although Berlusconi did not
stand for change, he was at least cheerful, smiling and entertaining.

Politics
is now all about personalities, as was shown by the rise of Grillo, but he and
Berlusconi are opposites in this regard. It is true
that the discrediting of traditional political parties, combined with the
preeminence of television, has given personalities a huge advantage in Italian
politics, even if neither the PD nor Monti seemed able to grasp this. Personalities
and even personal stories breed attention and loyalty, even if from different
groups. One of the last Italian politicians to understand and exploit this was,
unfortunately, Benito Mussolini.

Oh,
and did I forget to mention that Berlusconi owns Italy’s three main commercial
TV channels and its biggest advertising sales agency, and has billions of euros
in cash to hand around to supporters and allies? Well,
that isn’t a misleading indicator. But it is a reason, perhaps too obvious to
dwell upon, for Berlusconi’s continuing success at the ripe old age of 76.